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7 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Director - Substantive Support, NFAC

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FROM : [REDACTED]
NFAC Coordination Staff

SUBJECT : Response to DCI Comments on I&W Report

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REFERENCE : Memo from [REDACTED] Chairman, I&W Working Group,
dtd 4Aug78, same subject

A. General Approach

1. I believe that the best approach to the new memo from the DCI should highlight the following steps:

a. Take into consideration the approach taken by the HPSCI in its new 100 page study on I&W. Allegedly this report has been finished and should be ready for people here to review.

b. Try to retain much of the 22 June proposal and still support it if possible, while tightening up the argumentation in its favor.

c. Shift the new study structurally in order to present alternatives as desired by the DCI; in this regard, it may be best to use the approach taken by [REDACTED] in his memo, listing at a minimum the three proposals that he includes.

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d. Accompany the new study with a hard-hitting oral briefing of the DCI to present the argumentation and field queries from him.

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2. It appears, from the DCI's comments, that he does not fully grasp what is being recommended. He speaks of not wanting to authorize the creation of a new staff; that is not being recommended. Also, he probably needs to be convinced that the new committee is not another Watch Committee but is more of a watchdog group to see that the mechanism is functioning properly.

3. I suspect that he still needs to be convinced that I&W is not just NITC--i.e., a collection game. That is, of course, just the second stage. The first stage, if we are to do it right, is one of analysis; thus, NFAC is the button he should want to push first. To get at this sort of problem best, it might be useful to have the oral briefing mentioned above, on top of a new version of the 22 June study.

B. The Old Mechanism: The Watch Committee

1. There are a couple of points in Fred's memo (page 4) that we need either to expand or correct as they pertain to the Watch Committee.

2. It is not correct to say that the Watch Committee system did not receive the attention or presence of the DCI or DDCI. For most of the length of time of the Committee, the DDCI was the Chairman (we could get a list of the Chairmen from the SWS). Some DDCIs, especially Cabell and Cushman, played a very strong role. For a time, at the end the Chairmanship did revert to the D/OCI, and for a time it was of course under [] when he was also senior SIGINT officer.

3. In any case, it did also come to the attention not only of the DCI and DDCI but of the entire USIB membership since the reports

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had to be reviewed (and sometimes debated) at the weekly USIB meetings. (That, of course, was also one of its undoings, since the report, when produced once a week, was by virtue of that fact, much too sterile and bland.)

4. We will also have to spell out what we mean by the "attitudinal problems of senior intelligence officials," and probably add a similar comment on attitudinal problems of non-intelligence officials.

5. There were certainly sufficient attitudinal problems all around. Principally this boiled down to a lack of respect, in and outside the community, for what the Watch Committee and its very small staff could do. It could not, with its limited resources, keep up with the rest of the community in sounding strategic warning of enemy attack. It was also expected by too many officials to warn of "small-w" situations and it was attacked for not doing so. This is the very aspect of warning that is the most frustrating and the most difficult to solve: how to find a mechanism that is on the one hand strong enough to do its job of warning without being so strong that it cuts into other bureaucratic empires.

6. It is therefore just as important, in defining an I&W apparatus, to define what a group like the SWS is not responsible for as to define its specific responsibilities. One might try to set forth these various responsibilities clearly in a short and concise draft DCID, for example. In it one could delineate clearly the responsibilities of the revised SWS, the NIOs, the line current intelligence shops, etc.,

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as well as the new special assistant for warning, the DDCI, and the DDCI's committee.

25X1 7. One of the best people to put together this section on History would be who has a good grasp of the operations of both the Watch Committee/National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff, and may already have done some papers focusing on their specific problems and accomplishments.



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